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Periods of ownership of the respective parcels are stated in Plaintiffs trial Exhibit 3, R. p. 
9, during the relevant period as shown below: 
Dakers 
1975: Smolinski commences renting the property from 
Jim White for cattle pasturage. Tr., p. 27, 1. 1, 
Tr.I. 11. 
1982: Dakers purchase and 
Smolinski continues to rent pasture and 
maintains fence. R, p. 9. Tr., p. 28, 11. 4-9. 





1975: Floyd and Shirley Weddle to 
Elgin and Claudia Larson. 
1999: Sims (formerly Dodge) 
from Larsons. R, p. 1 
(Plaintiff trial Exhibit 3). 
Use and occupation of the Daker property consisted of renting the property to Smolinski 
who pastured cattle up to the fence line, which he maintained until 2004. The only possible 
evidence of use of the Simms property prior to their purchase was the testimony of Linda Beard, 
who said she recalls a five year period when her parents used the entire property to pasture cows, 
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chickens and goats. She further testified that the present fence constituting part of the disputed 
line, at that time extended around the entire perimeter of the boundary claimed by Simms.l Tr. p. 
85,11. 13-25, p. 86,11. 1-24. The Simms use consisted of picking fruit from wild trees and 
clearing brush around a salt lick for a better view of wildlife using the lick. There was no 
evidence of cultivation, or any type of use by the Simms up to the fence. Brush was cleared on 
the Simms' side of the fence only after commencement of this case. Tr. p. 79. 1. 22-25, pp. 80-82. 
Acquiescence is evidence of an agreement. But acquiescence requires more than passive 
acceptance ofthe existence of a fence. It is the conduct of the property owners of a nature that 
would give notice of an agreed boundary. And because a boundary agreement is binding on 
subsequent owners with notice, it is conduct prior to acquisition which is relevant. Here, there is 
evidence the fence existed in 1982, but no evidence of conduct by predecessors of the Simms or 
of acquiescence to use of the disputed area by predecessors of the Dakers prior to 1982. 
Even if the court were to find that Linda Beard's parents were the Larsons2, there is no 
evidence of record as to when this 5 year period of perimeter fencing and livestock pasturage 
occurred during the 25 years the Larsons owned the property prior to selling to the Simms. Tr. 
pp. 85, 86. 
I The present fence terminates at a point near U.S. highway 11. The remainder of the 
claimed boundary from that point is the highway right of way; easterly to the 1116th section line 
called in their deed. Tr. pp. 105-107,1. 4. 
2 The court actually determined from the evidence that Linda Beard's parents owned 
prior to the Larsons. R. p. 242. 
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B. Monument 
The location of the fence changed. The Sims claim the final leg of the boundary is the 
highway right of way-westerly from the southern end of the fence back to the 1116th section line. 
Linda Beard testified that at some time the fence ran parallel to the highway as a continuation of 
the fence as it exists today. Tr. p. 86. 11. 2-4. 
At some unknown point in time many years ago a section of the boundary fence in this 
case was removed and we now have the claim of a combination of a fence and a highway right 
of way marking the line. A fence line forming the entire perimeter imparts a different impression 
than a fence which ends at a point near a road. The monument must be such as to give notice to a 
prospective purchaser that the monument represents a boundary line. Weitz v. Green, 148 Idaho 
851,230 P.3d 743 (Idaho 2010). Here, much of the fence lies on the ground in a state of 
disrepair, and represents only part of the claimed line. Tr. pp. 105-109. 
C. Uncertain 
The court below simply concluded the north-south 1/16th section line called in the deeds 
was uncertain without finding any facts to support the conclusion. R. p. 244. A determination 
that every section line or fractional section line is uncertain until surveyed and marked would 
render the uncertainty requirement meaningless. 
Simms argues that the physical location of a long existing fence between adjacent owners 
makes no difference, citing Flying Elk Investment, LLC v. Cornwall, 149 Idaho 9, 232 P.3d 330 
(2010). 
Flying Elk involved a "nineteen acre sliver ofland". The fence in question was 
constructed by adjacent property owners and the fence itself ran roughly parallel to the line called 
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in the deeds. All subsequent owners farmed and grazed their respective properties up to either 
side of the fence, which was continuously maintained. A pond was installed on the disputed land 
with no objection from the adjacent owner, and the fence remained unchanged for over 50 years. 
Although a survey revealed the fence deviated from the line called in the respective deeds 
significantly in places, it could still be reasonable to infer the fence in Flying Elk was constructed 
to settle a dispute or uncertainty as to the true line, especially in light of the fact that the fence 
was constructed by adjacent owners of large tracts: 
The court also acknowledged that Harold and Joseph Whitworth agreed to place 
the fence roughly parallel to the true property line and that their respective 
successors in interest acquiesced in using the fence line as the boundary by using 
the land up to the fence. 
Flying Elk, at 15,337. 
In Johnson v. Newport, 131 Idaho 521, 960 P.2d 742 (1998), a fence was built along a 
creek which meandered back an forth across the true line; encroaching on both properties. 
Again, there was substantial evidence that both parties used the land on either side of the fence 
and the fence ran roughly parallel to the true line. 
Because ancient boundary fences were constructed without the benefit of survey 
equipment, it stands to reason that the agreed fence/boundary line would often deviate to some 
degree from the line located by a modem survey, more so ifthe line runs a long distance. But, 
there must be some logical connection between the physical location of the fence and the true 
line to infer the fence was constructed to resolve a dispute or uncertainty as to the location of the 
true line. See, Luce v. Marble, 142 Idaho 264, 127 P. 3d 167 (2005). 
It is not essential that the true line be absolutely unascertainable, for it is only 
where the true location is subsequently ascertained that actions involving disputed 
boundaries can arise. However, it has been held that ifthe calls of a deed are 
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sufficiently definite to be located by extrinsic evidence, the location of the 
boundary line cannot be changed by parol agreement unless the agreement was 
contemporaneous with the making of the deed. 
CJS Boundaries, § 132, p. 176. 
Here, the fact that the fence deviates immediately and increasingly from the true line for 
its entire length cannot be ignored. That the last leg of the line asserted to be the agreed line runs 
perpendicular from the last fence post east several hundred feet to the true north-south line 
makes it unreasonable to infer that the fence and the highway right-of-way, constituted 
monuments of an agreement to resolve a dispute or uncertainty as to the north-south line called in 
the deeds. If there was an agreement, it had to have been an agreement to change the line and 
thereby convey 3 acres to an unknown predecessor of the Simms. 
It is within the province of the trial court to find the elements of boundary by agreement. 
The appellate court has authority to determine if the finding of long acquiescence to a clearly 
marked line is supported by substantial and competent evidence, and if so, whether mere 
acquiescence meets the burden. 
DATED this J 3day of August, 2012. 
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